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ECB • Working Paper No 279 • October 2003 3Abstract
This study analyzes international monetary policy cooperation in a two-
country dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities, monop-
olistic competition and producer currency pricing. A quadratic approxima-
tion to the utility of the consumers is derived and assumed as the policy
objective function of the policymakers.
It is shown that only under special conditions there are no gains from
cooperation and moreover that the paths of the exchange rate and prices
in the constrained-e±cient solution depend on the kind of disturbance that
a®ects the economy. It might be the case either for ¯xed or °oating exchange
rates. Despite this result, simple targeting rules that involve only targets for
the growth of output and for both domestic GDP and CPI in°ation rates
can replicate the cooperative allocation.
Keywords: monetary policy cooperation, sticky prices, welfare analysis,
targeting rules, in°ation target.
JEL classi¯cation: E52, F41, F42.
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This study analyzes international monetary policy cooperation in a two-country
dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities, monopolistic compe-
tition and producer currency pricing. We consider a model in which both the
structure of the economy and the welfare criteria of the policymakers are derived
from microfoundations. We revisit the scope for international monetary policy co-
operation in a world in which goods and capital markets are perfectly integrated
and where the disturbances that a®ect the economies are originated from produc-
tivity, demand, public expenditure and mark-up shocks.
This model aims to answer to some interesting questions in international macroe-
conomics. For example, what is the optimal choice of exchange rate regime in a
perfectly integrated world? How is it possible to design monetary policy institu-
tions that achieve the optimal cooperative outcome?
In general, in the optimal cooperative outcome, the behavior of the exchange
rate depends on the kind of disturbance that hits the economy. Previous papers
in the literature have shown that in the optimal cooperative allocation, the ex-
change rate moves in order to accommodate asymmetric productivity shocks as in
the Friedman's case for °exible exchange rates while monetary policymakers are
left with the domestic goal of price stability. We show that this result does not
generalize to other shocks and to a more general model speci¯cation. When there
are other disturbances such as mark-up and public expenditure shocks, a di®erent
behavior arises and the optimal cooperative outcome may imply a managed or
sometimes a ¯xed exchange rate regime. On the other hand, prices and outputs
move to accommodate the shocks.
At a ¯rst sight, this result would suggest that the task of designing institutions
that can implement the cooperative solution is a di±cult one, since it would require
to specify some control of the exchange rate conditional on the type of disturbance
that occurs. Indeed, policymakers that maximize in a non-cooperative game their
own country's welfare are not in general able to replicate the cooperative allocation
and gains from international monetary policy cooperation naturally arise in our
model.
Despite this initial premise, we show that it is still possible to design simple
targeting rules that implement the optimal cooperative outcome. In particular
these targeting rules can be written as a combination of only domestic targets, both
GDP and CPI in°ation rates and the output growth, with no explicit reference to
the exchange rate.
Targeting rules of the kind proposed here describe the optimizing behavior of
central banks. They present some desirable properties. First, by committing to
them, policymakers can implement the optimal cooperative allocation in a deter-
minate equilibrium and moreover the rules are robust to di®erent kind of shocks
ECB • Working Paper No 279 • October 2003 5and their properties. They are `°exible' meaning that the desired levels for the
target variables should not be achieved simultaneously but deviations are possible
provided a special linear combination of target variables is kept equal to zero.
Another contribution of our analysis is the derivation of quadratic represen-
tations for the welfare of each country that can be directly compared to their
closed-economy counterpart and to the ones that are instead just assumed in the
previous literature on international monetary policy cooperation. Di®erently from
both literatures, each country's utility approximation is quadratic in the devia-
tions of the terms of trade, domestic and foreign outputs and GDP in°ation rates
from country-speci¯c targets. These quadratic loss functions capture the di®erent
objectives that countries should aim to in formulating their stabilization policies.
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come increasingly interdependent. Monetary policy in each country af-
fects economic welfare both at home and abroad: the policymaker in
each country generates externalities for the policymakers in the other
countries. Therefore, the policymaker in each country must take ac-
count of the actions of policymakers in other countries."1
The previous quotation outlines the basic idea behind the literature on in-
ternational monetary policy cooperation in the 80's and 90's. The existence of
externalities, whether positive or negative, is the source of a need of international
monetary cooperation when countries do not internalize the e®ects of their actions
on other countries.
In this study, we depart from the previous literature, discussed among others
in Canzoneri and Gray (1985), Canzoneri and Henderson (1991) and Persson and
Tabellini (1995), by considering a two-country model in which both the structure
of the economy and the welfare criteria of the policymakers are derived from micro-
foundations.2 We revisit the scope for international monetary policy cooperation in
a world in which goods and capital markets are perfectly integrated and where the
disturbances that a®ect the economies are originated from productivity, demand,
public expenditure and mark-up shocks.
This model aims to answer to some interesting questions in international macroe-
conomics. For example, what is the optimal choice of exchange rate regime in a
perfectly integrated world? How is it possible to design monetary policy institu-
tions that achieve the optimal cooperative outcome?
In general, in the optimal cooperative outcome, the behavior of the exchange
rate depends on the kind of disturbance that hits the economy. In a similar
model under the assumption that consumer prices are fully responsive to exchange
1Canzoneri and Henderson (1991), pg. 1.
2Our approach follows recent contributions in the open-macro literature which have studied
the analysis of international monetary cooperation with microfounded models and utility-based
welfare criteria, as Benigno and Benigno (2003), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Devereux and Engel
(2003), Obstfeld and Rogo® (2002), Sutherland (2002a, 2002b), Tille (2003). However, di®erently
from these analyses, we characterize a dynamic model in which prices are sticky and staggered
following the Calvo (1983) model and we allow for a more general structure of the economy, in
terms of preferences and shocks. With the use of numerical methods, Kollman (2003), Tchakarov
(2003) and Sutherland (2001) have evaluated optimal monetary policies in two-country dynamic
general equilibrium models.
ECB • Working Paper No 279 • October 2003 7rate movements, Devereux and Engel (2003) and Obstfeld and Rogo® (2002) have
shown that in the optimal cooperative allocation, the exchange rate moves in order
to accommodate asymmetric productivity shocks as in the Friedman's case for °ex-
ible exchange rates while monetary policymakers are left with the domestic goal of
price stability.3 We show that this result does not generalize to other shocks and
to a more general model speci¯cation. When there are other disturbances such
as mark-up and public expenditure shocks, a di®erent behavior arises and the op-
timal cooperative outcome may imply a managed or sometimes a ¯xed exchange
rate regime. On the other hand, prices and outputs move to accommodate the
shocks.
At a ¯rst sight, this result would suggest that the task of designing institutions
that can implement the cooperative solution is a di±cult one, since it would require
to specify some control of the exchange rate conditional on the type of disturbance
that occurs. Indeed, policymakers that maximize in a non-cooperative game their
own country's welfare are not in general able to replicate the cooperative allocation
and gains from international monetary cooperation naturally arise in our model.4
Despite this initial premise, we show that it is still possible to design simple
targeting rules that implement the optimal cooperative outcome. In particular
these targeting rules can be written as a combination of only domestic targets, both
GDP and CPI in°ation rates and the output growth, with no explicit reference to
the exchange rate.
As ¯rst emphasized by Svensson (2002, 2003), targeting rules of the kind pro-
posed here can be interpreted as Euler equations that describe the optimizing
behavior of central banks. In our context, they are constructed using the ¯rst-
order conditions of the optimal cooperative solutions following the principles of
Giannoni and Woodford (2002). As in the latter work, the rules that we propose
present some desirable properties. First, by committing to them, policymakers
can implement the optimal cooperative allocation in a determinate equilibrium
and moreover the rules are robust to di®erent kind of shocks and their properties.
They are `°exible' meaning that the desired levels for the target variables should
3Friedman (1953).
4Only under special cases the non-cooperative and cooperative solutions coincide. Our analysis
here nests the cases discussed in Benigno and Benigno (2003), Devereux and Engel (2003) and
Obstfeld and Rogo® (2002).
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combination of target variables is kept equal to zero.
Another contribution of our analysis is the derivation of quadratic represen-
tations for the welfare of each country that can be directly compared to their
closed-economy counterpart and to the ones that are instead just assumed in the
previous literature on international monetary policy cooperation.5 Di®erently from
both literatures, each country's utility approximation is quadratic in the deviations
of the terms of trade, domestic and foreign outputs and GDP in°ation rates from
country-speci¯c targets. These quadratic loss functions capture the di®erent ob-
jectives that countries should aim to in formulating their stabilization policies.
The paper is structured as it follows. Section 1 presents the structure of the
model. Section 2 presents the quadratic approximation to the utility-based welfare
criteria. Section 3 studies the optimal transmission mechanism in cooperative
allocation. Section 4 analyzes the gains from cooperation. Section 5 shows how
to design targeting rules that can implement the cooperative solution. Section 6
concludes.
1 Structure of the Model
Household behavior
We consider a world economy populated by a measure one of households. The
population on the segment [0;n) belongs to the Home country (H) while the one on
the segment [n;1] belongs to the Foreign country (F). Each individual maximizes



















where the index j denotes a variable that is speci¯c to household j and the index
i denotes a variable speci¯c to the country H or F in which j resides. To clarify
the notation that follows i will be replaced by a star when referring to country F
and will be suppressed when referring to country H; Et denotes the expectation
5Our model here may ¯ll the lack of `microeconomic underpinnings' in the literature of inter-
national monetary cooperation (see Persson and Tabellini, 1995).
ECB • Working Paper No 279 • October 2003 9conditional on the information set at date t and ¯ is the intertemporal discount
factor, with 0 < ¯ < 1. Households get utility from consumption and disutility
from producing goods. The function U is increasing and concave in the consump-
tion index C which is de¯ned as a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of home and foreign
























F are consumption sub-indexes of the continuum of di®erentiated
































where ¾ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across goods produced within a country
and µ is the elasticity of substitution between the bundles CH and CF. It is assumed
that there is a continuum of goods produced in country H and F on the respective
segments [0;n) and [n;1]. All the goods are traded across borders with no trade
frictions. Here »i denotes a generic vector of shocks (to be speci¯ed in the analysis
that follows) which are speci¯c to country i. The appropriate consumption-based









































where pi(h) and pi(f) are prices in units of domestic currency of the home-produced
and foreign-produced goods, respectively. Prices are set in the currency of the
producer and the law of one price holds: p(h) = Sp¤(h) and p(f) = Sp¤(f), where
S is the nominal exchange rate (the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic
currency). Given these assumptions and the structure of preferences, purchasing
power parity holds, i.e. P = SP ¤. Moreover relative prices are independent of the
currency of denomination, which means that when writing relative-price variables
ECB • Working Paper No 279 • October 2003 10we can suppress the index i. The terms of trade are de¯ned as the relative price













µ¡1 + (1 ¡ n): (1.1)
Finally V is an increasing convex function of household j's supply of one of the
di®erentiated good y(j) produced in its country. The total demands of the generic































0 Cjdj is aggregate consumption in the world economy and G and
G¤ are country-speci¯c government purchase shocks. By applying the appropriate
aggregators to the above total demands of the di®erentiated goods, we obtain a

















From (1.1) and (1.3), it follows that movements in the terms of trade divert demand
across countries.
We assume that markets are complete both at domestic and international levels.
Households can trade in a set of nominal state-contingent securities denominated in
the currency of the home country and they all inherit initial state-contingent wealth
at time 0 such that their lifetime budget constraints are identical. This complete-
market assumption implies that consumption is perfectly risk-shared among house-







at all times and across all states of nature. Equation (1.4) is derived from the set
of optimality conditions that characterize the optimal allocation of wealth among
the state-contingent securities, having used the assumption on the initial level of
ECB • Working Paper No 279 • October 2003 11wealth and the fact that purchasing power parity holds.6 At each time t, there is
one of these conditions for each of the states of nature at time t + 1. The set of
optimality conditions of the households' behavior is completed by the appropriate
transversality conditions.






















t are country-speci¯c preference shocks appropriately normalized.
We interpret gi
t as a country-speci¯c demand shock and ai
t as a country-speci¯c
productivity shock. Here ½ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution in consumption, with ½ > 0, and ´ is the inverse of the elasticity of goods
production,with ´ ¸ 0.
Price-setting mechanism
Each household acts as a monopolist in selling its di®erentiated good. The
overall demand of its good (1.2) is a®ected by the price chosen while P;PH;PF
and CW are taken as given. The price setting behavior is modelled following a
partial adjustment rule ¶ a la Calvo (1983) according to which each seller has the
opportunity to change its price with a given probability 1¡®. We allow for di®erent
®i across countries. When a household in the home country has the opportunity to
set a new price in period t; it does so in order to maximize the expected discounted
value of its net pro¯ts. The price setting decision at t determines the net pro¯ts
at t+s only in states of nature in which the seller does not change the price from










(1 ¡ ¿T)~ pt(h)~ yt;T(h) ¡ V (~ yt;T(h);»T)
¸
,
6We do not report these conditions here since they will not be used in the analysis that follows.
Nor we report the standard stochastic Euler equations that price the risk-free nominal interest
rates which are implied by these conditions because they will be needed only to determine the
optimal path of the interest rates in a residual way, once the optimal paths of in°ation and
consumption are derived. Our model can be interpreted as a cashless limiting model (as in
Woodford, 1998).
7All households within a country that can modify their price at a certain time face the same
discounted value of the streams of current and future marginal costs under the assumption that
the new price is maintained. Thus they will set the same price.
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utility of nominal income, UC(CT;»T)=PT, which is the same for all households
belonging to a country because of the complete-market assumption; ¿t denotes a
time-varying tax on sales;8 ~ pt(h) denotes the price of the good h chosen at date
t in the producer currency and ~ yt;T(h) is the total demand of good h at time T






























(1 ¡ ¿t)(¾ ¡ 1)
¾
:
In particular ¹t can be interpreted as the ine±cient wedge in the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and goods production when prices are °exible.
In what follows we will refer to °uctuations in this wedge as mark-up shocks. Given
the Calvo's mechanism, the evolution of the price index PH is described by the





H;t¡1 + (1 ¡ ®)~ pt(h)
1¡¾. (1.7)
Similar conditions hold for the producers in country F, with the appropriate mod-
i¯cations.
8We introduce a time-varying tax on sales only to obtain ine±cient °uctuations in the wedge
between the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and goods production. We could
have obtained the same outcome by introducing an heterogenous labor market in each industry
and having a time-varying monopoly power of wage setters as in Clarida et al. (2002) and
Woodford (2003). Giannoni (2001) obtains the same outcome by introduction a time-varying
elasticity of substitution ¾. To complete the characterization of the model, we assume that
there are lump-sum taxes so that the intertemporal budget constraint of the government is not
a constraint to take care of.
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A micro-founded model delivers a natural measure of welfare based on households'





































We interpret W and W ¤ as the policy objective function for the respective mone-
tary policymakers H and F.
Our model is not solvable in a closed-form solution and we approximate it





t) all take constant values equal across countries and
such that ¹ a, ¹ g, ¹ G > 0 and ¹ ¹ ¸ 1. We further focus on a steady-state in which
¦H;t ´ PH;t=PH;t¡1 = 1 and ¦¤
F;t ´ P ¤
F;t=P ¤
F;t¡1 = 1.9 In this steady-state ¹ T = 1,
¹ C = ¹ C¤, ¹ Y = ¹ Y ¤ and ¹ UC( ¹ C;0) = ¹ ¹¹ Vy(¹ Y ;0): Unless ¹ ¹ = 1, the steady-state output
and consumption are ine±ciently low.
In the technical appendix we show that a second-order approximation to these
objective functions can be written as
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9Following Benigno and Woodford (2003), it can be shown that this steady state is the solution
of necessary conditions of a constrained-optimization problem.
ECB • Working Paper No 279 • October 2003 14where we have de¯ned sc ´ C=¹ Y and ki ´ (1 ¡ ®i)(1 ¡ ®i¯)=[®i(1 + ¾´)] and
hats denote log-deviations of the variables from the steady-state, while ¼H;t ´
lnPH;t=PH;t¡1 and ¼¤
F;t ´ lnP ¤
F;t=P ¤
F;t¡1: With t.i.p. we denote terms that are
independent of policy and with O(jj»jj3) we denote terms that are of third order
or higher in an appropriate bound on the amplitude of the shocks. Following the
method of Benigno and Woodford (2003), we use a second-order approximation
to the structural equilibrium conditions to solve for the linear terms in (2.8) and
(2.9).10 As shown in the technical appendix, we take a second-order approximation
to the pair of equations in (1.1) and (1.3), to equation (1.4), to equations (1.6)
and (1.7) and the respective country F's counterpart; we combine appropriately
those second-order approximations to eliminate the linear terms in (2.8) and (2.9).
In order to abstract from the time-inconsistent features of the solutions, since at
time 0 some prices are ¯xed from previous periods, we assume that policymakers
are committed to past promises following a `timeless perspective' commitment, as
discussed in Woodford (2003, ch. 7). Using this form of commitment, we obtain
that the maximization of the welfare of each country is equivalent to minimize the


































































¼f are parameters, de¯ned
in the technical appendix, and ~ Y h
H;t, ~ Y h
F;t, ~ T h






t are combinations of
the shocks of the model, de¯ned as well in the technical appendix, and have the
interpretation of desired levels for the respective variables.
Our approach shows that a quadratic representation of a welfare-based loss
function has a di®erent form compared to the quadratic objective functions that
10In a two-country model, Sutherland (2002b) has ¯rst used second-order approximations to the
structural equilibrium conditions to derive an analytical quadratic representation of the welfare
for each country. However, he focuses on a static model in which all prices are ¯xed one-period
in advance.
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cooperation. In those papers, the loss functions of the policymakers were quadratic
in the deviations of output (or unemployment) with respect to a `desired' level and
in the CPI in°ation rate, as in Canzoneri and Gray (1985) and Canzoneri and Hen-
derson (1991). Other studies, as Persson and Tabellini (1995, 1996) have included
also a concern for terms of trade stabilization. First, we emphasize that the loss
functions of country H and F present the same target variables but with di®er-
ent weights and di®erent `desired' targets. In particular each policymaker should
be concerned about quadratic deviations of both domestic and foreign outputs,
domestic and foreign GDP in°ation rates and of the terms of trade from country-
speci¯c desired targets. These expressions di®er sharply from their closed-economy
correspondents, as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Woodford (2003, ch. 6)
and Benigno and Woodford (2003). In these studies the loss function is usually
quadratic in the in°ation rate and in the deviation of output with respect to a
desired target. This should be less surprising result once we observe that the ob-
jective function captures the distortions existing in the economy and that the two
countries are interdependent both in the consumption and in the production of
goods. In a static model, with prices all ¯xed one-period in advance, Sutherland
(2002b) has shown that home and foreign utility-based welfare criteria depend on
foreign and domestic outputs as well as on the nominal exchange rate.
3 The cooperative allocation
We ¯rst analyze the cooperative allocation with particular interest on the e±cient
transmission mechanism of shocks and the implied path of prices and exchange
rate. We assume that policymakers that enter a cooperative agreement maximize
a weighted average of the countries' welfare function
W
W = nW + (1 ¡ n)W
¤:
In the technical appendix, we show that the cooperative allocation in a `timeless'
perspective commitment can be equivalently described as the choice of the paths
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¼f and the variables ~ Y w
H;t, ~ Y w
F;t, ~ T w
t are de¯ned
in the technical appendix. Here the variables ~ Y w
H;t, ~ Y w
F;t, ~ T w
t represent the desired
targets for the respective variables when countries cooperate. Minimization of the
loss function is subject to the following constraints: the log-linear approximations
to the AS equations
¼H;t = ·[(^ YH;t ¡ ~ Y
w
H;t) + (1 ¡ n)Ã(^ Tt ¡ ~ T
w






F;t ¡ ~ Y
w
F;t) ¡ nÃ(^ Tt ¡ ~ T
w





for country H and F; respectively, and the relation between terms of trade and
outputs obtained by combining the log-linear approximations of (1.1) and (1.3)
(^ Tt ¡ ~ T
w
t ) = µ
¡1s
¡1
c [(^ YH;t ¡ ~ Y
w
H;t) ¡ (^ Y
¤
F;t ¡ ~ Y
w
F;t)] (3.15)
where we have de¯ned ·i ´ ki(½s¡1
c + ´) and Ã ´ (1 ¡ ½µ)=(½s¡1
c + ´) and where
ut and u¤
t are combinations of the structural shocks of the model, as shown in the
technical appendix. By specifying a path for ¼H;t and ¼¤
F;t, the variables ^ YH;t, ^ Y ¤
F;t
and ^ Tt can be determined by (3.13)-(3.15) and this is all that is needed to evaluate
(2.10), (2.11) or (3.12). Finally we need to consider the constraints on the initial
conditions of ¼H;0 and ¼¤
F;0 implied by the `timeless perspective' equilibrium and
given by ¼H;0 = ¹ ¼H;0 and ¼¤
F;0 = ¹ ¼¤
F;0. 12
Equations (3.13) and (3.14) represent the aggregate supply equations for coun-
tries H and F obtained by log-linearizing equations (1.6) and (1.7) for each country.
As in the closed economy counterpart, e.g. Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone
11Our cooperative welfare criterion is obtained from a quadratic approximation around the
same deterministic steady state around which we have approximated our single country welfare
criteria. Since ¹ ¹ ¸ 1, we will refer to the cooperative outcome as constrained-e±cient.
12Here ¹ ¼H;0 and ¹ ¼¤
F;0 are functions of predetermined and exogenous variables that will be self-
consistent in the equilibrium in the sense that they will be the same functions that will result in
equilibrium at later dates.
ECB • Working Paper No 279 • October 2003 17(2002), GDP in°ation depends on the present discounted value of the aggregate
real marginal costs. However, in open economies, real marginal costs are not
in general only proportional to the output gap but they also depend on relative
prices, namely the terms of trade.(see Svensson, 2000) This dependence captures
the expenditure-switching e®ect; only in the special case in which ½µ = 1 the terms
of trade channel disappears. Equations (3.13) and (3.14) replace the traditional
expectations-augmented Phillips-curve of the models of Canzoneri and Henderson
(1991), and Persson and Tabellini (1995, 1996). Equation (3.15) captures the rela-
tion between terms of trade and output di®erential across countries. This relation
is also familiar to the previous literature.
As shown in the technical appendix, the shocks ut and u¤
t are combinations
of all the exogenous shocks of the model (not necessarily mark-up shocks) and
capture the deviations of the natural levels of output and terms of trade {the ones
that would prevail under °exible prices{ from their desired targets, as de¯ned in
(3.12). In general, for any kind of shock, the optimal cooperative solution may not
aim at mimicking the allocation that would arise under °exible prices.
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where we have de¯ned yH;t ´ (^ YH;t ¡ ~ Y w
H;t), y¤
F;t ´ (^ Y ¤
F;t ¡ ~ Y w
F;t) and qt ´ (^ Tt ¡ ~ T w
t )
and we have appropriately normalized the Lagrange multiplier in a way to obtain
time-invariant ¯rst-order conditions. The ¯rst-order condition with respect to yH;t,
y¤
F;t and qt are
¸
w














q qt = Ã'1;t ¡ Ã'2;t ¡ '3;t; (3.18)




¼h¼H;t = ¡('1;t ¡ '1;t¡1); (3.19)





F;t = ¡('2;t ¡ '2;t¡1); (3.20)
for each t ¸ 0.
We show in the appendix that equations (3.16){(3.20), combined with the struc-
tural equations (3.13){(3.15) and the initial conditions '1;¡1 and '2;¡1 determine
the equilibrium path of outputs, in°ation rates, and terms of trade along with the
Lagrangian multipliers.
Our ¯rst objective is to characterize the constrained-e±cient response of prices
and exchange rate, among other variables, to the various disturbances that a®ect
the economy. In previous related works, Devereux and Engel (2003) and Obstfeld
and Rogo® (2002) have shown that, under producer currency pricing, the adjust-
ment to asymmetric productivity shocks should be brought about by exchange rate
movements. Their argument revisits in a micro-founded model the Friedman's case
for °exible exchange rates. When prices are sticky, relative price movements are
obtained through changes in the nominal exchange rate. In this way demand can
be distributed e±ciently across countries.
Our framework allows for a direct analysis of the robustness of these ¯ndings
in a much more general model. An alternative way to approach the Friedman's
argument for °exible exchange rate is to ask when it is optimal to maintain nominal
prices, the ones that are sticky, stable and let the exchange rate absorb all the
adjustment. In our model, this is equivalent to study under which conditions the
°exible-price allocation is optimal, since stability of producer in°ation rates at all
times, ¼H;t = ¼¤
F;t = 0 for all t; replicates the °exible-price allocation.
Our results weaken the case for a °oating exchange rate regime. Indeed, the
°exible price allocation is the optimal cooperative outcome only under special cases
(see the technical appendix). The intuition relies on the evaluation of distortions
and externalities built into the model. Here there are two distortions. The exis-
tence of monopoly power in goods market produces an ine±cient output level in
both countries while the staggering price-setting mechanism creates dispersions of
demand across goods produced with the same technology under non-zero producer
in°ation. The assumption of nominal price stickiness gives a role for monetary
policy to correct these ine±ciencies.
In a cooperative agreement, policymakers aim to commit to policies that raise
the expected level of consumption and output in both countries, since they are in-
ECB • Working Paper No 279 • October 2003 19e±ciently low. As in Henderson and Kim (1999) and Obstfeld and Rogo® (1998),
the ability to precommit does not prevent this possibility because the expected
values of variables depend on the expected value of ¯rst-order and second-order
terms.13 In general, when ¹ ¹ > 1, i.e. the steady-state level of output is inef-
¯ciently low, stabilization policy could be used to increase the expected level of
output. Importantly this happens no matter what is the source of the disturbances
(productivity, demand, mark-up or public expenditure) or their nature (symmetric
or asymmetric).
On the other hand a °oating exchange rate regime is optimal when the com-
posite shocks u and u¤ are always zero. Here we discuss the cases in which this
happens. When the steady-state level of output is e±cient, ¹ ¹ = 1; it follows
that ut = ^ ¹t and u¤
t = ^ ¹¤
t: Absent pure mark-up shocks, it is optimal to stabilize




[^ at ¡ ^ a
¤
t ¡ ( ^ Gt ¡ ^ G
¤
t)]: (3.21)
When the home country has a favorable productivity shocks, the home currency
depreciates so that the demand for the home-produced goods can increase. The
same e®ect follows a decrease in home government purchases. Instead, a mark-
up shock drives an ine±cient wedge in the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and goods production; in this case monetary policymakers have a role
in stabilizing those ine±ciencies and move away from the °exible price allocation.
The optimality of the °exible exchange rate regime holds also in the special
case in which ¹ ¹ > 1, the steady-state level of government expenditure is zero,
i.e. sc = 1; and there are no mark-up or government expenditure shocks, i.e.
^ ¹t = ^ ¹¤
t = ^ Gt = ^ G¤
t = 0. Again following productivity shocks the exchange rate
behaves as in (3.21).14
On the other side, our analysis would suggest the optimality of ¯xed exchange
rate regime in the special case in which ¹ ¹ = 1, µsc = ¾ and the economy is subject
only to mark-up and demand shocks (see the technical appendix). The general
13Loosely speaking, in a commitment equilibrium the expected value of ¯rst-order terms is
equal to zero, while terms of order higher than the second are not relevant in a second-order
approximation.
14This case can be interpreted as an `isoelastic' case in which even if one wishes the expected
level of output cannot be moved and the stabilization to the shocks is no longer distorted
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restrictions, the type of disturbance might suggest a very di®erent prescription in
terms of exchange rate regime even in our very simple framework.
In order to study the optimal transmission mechanism of shocks, we calibrate
a quarterly model for countries with equal size, i.e. n = 1=2. Following Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997), we assume that ¯ = 0:99 and ´ = 0:47. We assume ® = 0:66
and ®¤ = 0:75 implying an average length of price contracts equal to 3 and 4,
respectively. We assume that the elasticity ¾ across goods produced within a
country is 10, while the steady-state tax rate is ¹ ¿ = 0:2, which imply a value
for ¹ ¹ equal to 1:38 and a steady-state mark up of 38%. The steady-state level
of consumption over output is calibrated to sc = 0:8. Finally, the risk aversion
coe±cient ½ is usually assumed to be in a range between 1 and 5, and we use 3, while
following Obstfeld and Rogo® (2000), the intratemporal elasticity of substitution
µ is in the range 3 to 6 and we choose 4:5. An important implication of this
calibration is that µ > 1
½, i.e. the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is higher
than the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,which means that the home and
foreign bundles of goods are substitute in the utility. 15
Figure 1 shows the impulse response functions of several variables to a posi-
tive temporary productivity shock in the home country. Although the calibration
used would imply a departure from the °exible-price allocation, this departure is
quantitatively negligible. The GDP in°ation rates and the output gaps (the latter
taken with respect to the cooperative desired levels) do not move. All the adjust-
ment is brought about by the terms of trade through the exchange rate. As the
home country is experiencing a favorable productivity shock, demand should be
diverted to home-produced goods since they are produced more e±ciently. This
can be done by a depreciation of the home currency which improves the terms of
trade of the country and increases the demand and production of the goods.
A di®erent outcome arises following a temporary home mark-up shock, as shown
in ¯gure 2. In a similar way to the closed-economy model of Clarida et al. (1999)
and Woodford (2003, ch. 3), a mark-up shock in the home country is absorbed
by a temporary fall in the home output gap and by an initial jump in home GDP
15Two goods are substitute in the utility when the marginal utility of one good decreases as
the consumption of the other good increases.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses of home and foreign outputs, home and foreign GDP
in°ation rates, terms of trade and exchange rate to a home productivity shock.
in°ation rate. After the shock, the output gap converges back to the initial steady
state and the price level converges as well to the initial level through periods of
de°ation. The fall in the output worsen the home country terms of trade ( ^ T
decreases) The key insight to understand the optimal transmission mechanism of
the mark-up shock across countries is the link between foreign real marginal costs
and the terms of trade. When goods are substitute in utility, an improvement
in the foreign terms of trade ( ^ T decreases) reduces the real marginal costs for
foreign producers, acting as a negative mark-up shock for them. Producer prices
fall and the output gap rises. Home and foreign output gaps and the two GDP
in°ation rates commove in a negative way following the shock. Under a di®erent
parametrization, µ < 1
½, the commovement would be positive, while no spillover
e®ect would occur if µ = 1
½. In the calibrated example the exchange rate appreciates
but moves less than in the case the economy is hit by a productivity shock. There
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Figure 2: Impulse responses of home and foreign outputs, home and foreign GDP
in°ation rates, terms of trade and exchange rate to a home mark-up shock.
can be cases in which the exchange rate does not move at all following mark-
up shocks. Most interesting, following any kind of stationary shock, the optimal
cooperative solution requires both prices and exchange rate to revert back to their
initial values.
4 Gains from cooperation






t=0; in order to minimize its loss function, (2.10) or (2.11),
taking as given the strategy of the other policymaker. Policymakers have di®erent
incentives.
Each policymaker wishes to raise the expected utility of consumption and at
the same time to lower the expected disutility of producing goods by diverting
ECB • Working Paper No 279 • October 2003 23production to the other country. This can be done by a strategic use of the terms
of trade. Indeed, in a non-cooperative equilibrium, each country can impose a
negative externality on the other country in order to increase its own expected
utility. It follows that the desired stabilization of the shocks, as perceived from a
single country perspective, is di®erent from the cooperative one. This is re°ected
by the di®erences among the loss functions (2.10), (2.11) and (3.12). Here, we note
that there are two dimensions along which these di®erences arise: policymakers
might target a di®erent level for each variable or might put a di®erent weight on
the same component of the loss function.
However, there are some cases in which cooperative and non-cooperative equi-
libria coincide, as shown in the technical appendix. One simple case is when
L = L¤ = LW. This occurs when at the same time µ = 1, i.e. preferences are
Cobb-Douglas across home and foreign produced goods, sc = 1, i.e. there is no
steady-state public expenditure, and moreover when there are only productivity
shocks, ^ at and ^ a¤
t; and symmetric demand shocks, i.e. ^ gt = ^ g¤
t: We retrieve here
the Obstfeld and Rogo® (2002) case. As discussed in Benigno and Benigno (2003),
there is too much risk-sharing under these parameter restrictions. Indeed, the ex-
pected disutilities of goods production are equalized across countries along with
the marginal utilities of consumption. In this case the terms of trade is ine®ective
in stabilizing shocks for its own country's utility, since the disutility of goods pro-
duction is tied across countries. In a numerical example, Sutherland (2001, 2002b)
and Tchakarov (2002) have quanti¯ed as important the gains from cooperation in
the case that µ di®ers from 1.
Having observed that the nature of the negative externality lies directly in the
use of the terms of trade, we can look at other cases of no gains from cooperation
by focusing on the particular case in which the terms of trade channel is not ef-
fective. The previous literature on international monetary policy cooperation (see
Sachs, 1988) has related the gains of cooperation to a parameter of interdependence
that measures the importance of the terms of trade in the transmission mechanism
across countries. In our context, the terms of trade interdependence is determined
by the parameter Ã: When the intratemporal and intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution are equal, i.e. µ = 1=½; then Ã = 0 and each policymaker can control
its own output by manoeuvring its own GDP in°ation rate. However, di®erently
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gains from cooperation. Indeed, as clari¯ed in Canzoneri et al. (2002), the case
in which µ = 1=½ describes economies that are independent of the terms of trade
only in goods production, but they are still interrelated in goods consumption.
As shown in the technical appendix, the cooperative loss function (3.12), under
this parameters restriction, simpli¯es to a quadratic form that displays only GDP
in°ations and output targets, since ¸w
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F;t] + t:o:c: (4.23)
for country F, where t:o:c: denotes terms that are out of the control of the policy-
maker and include foreign GDP in°ation and output. Note that these loss functions
mirror the ones that arise in closed-economy models, as in Woodford (2003, ch. 6),
since the objective function that can be controlled by each policymaker collapses
to a standard quadratic function in an appropriately de¯ned domestic output gap
and GDP in°ation. However, this result does not imply that cooperative and non
cooperative solutions will necessarily coincide, since there are still spillover e®ects
on consumption. Indeed the central planner weighs each country disutility of goods
production less than what the single country does, since it recognizes that produc-
tion in the country is absorbed by consumption in both economies, while the single
country weighs more its disutility of goods production since it does not internalize
the consumption and the utility of consumption of the other country. The optimal
stabilization policies will be di®erent between the cooperative and non-cooperative
equilibria. Only when the desired targets between the pairs of loss functions L,
LW and L¤, LW coincide, i.e. ~ ~ Y h
H;t = ~ Y w
H;t and ~ ~ Y
f
F;t = ~ Y w
F;t; then the cooperative
and non-cooperative equilibria coincide and there are no gains from cooperation.
In the technical appendix, we show that this happens when sc = 1 and there are
only productivity shocks and symmetric demand shocks.
The analysis of symmetric shocks is also an interesting source of comparisons
with the previous literature. Models in the fashion of Canzoneri and Henderson
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disturbances. Obstfeld and Rogo® (2002) instead show that with symmetric pro-
ductivity shocks there are no gains from coordination. Here, we ¯nd that this
result holds both for symmetric productivity and demand shocks, provided sc = 1.
Otherwise, with other kind of disturbances, as for example mark-up and public
expenditure shocks, or with sc < 1, there are still gains from cooperation even
when shocks are global.16
In general, the model analyzed here shows that the conditions under which
there are no gains from cooperation are very restrictive. Although we do not
quantify the magnitude of the gains from cooperation, it is worth mentioning that
public expenditure shocks and mark-up shocks have been found to be important
driving factors of the business cycle, as in Gal¶ ³ et al. (2003). Moreover, some
simple numerical examples of Canzoneri et al. (2001) and Tchakarov (2002) have
shown that this class of models which rely on microfounded loss functions can
produce larger gains from cooperation than the previous literature did in the 80's
and 90's
5 Designing targeting rules for international mon-
etary cooperation
In the previous sections, we have considered policymakers that maximize the util-
ity of the consumers in their respective countries. However, a policymaker that
shares the preferences of the consumers or society does not internalize the negative
externality that it may impose on other countries. How is then possible to design
institutions, as central banks, with the `right incentives'? There are several ex-
amples in the literature in which this issue is solved by delegating a new objective
function to an independent agent, a central bank, as shown in the contributions of
Rogo® (1985), Persson and Tabellini (1993, 1995, 1996), Walsh (1995), Svensson
(1997), and Jensen (2000, 2002). As discussed in Svensson (2002, 2003), the design
of institutions by imposing a commitment to a loss function can be interpreted as
16Sutherland (2002b) shows that even symmetric productivity shocks may imply gains from
cooperation. His framework is di®erent from ours: indeed, he considers a structure in which
contingent claims market open after policy makers have chosen their policy strategies.
a `general targeting rule', which is a general operational objective.
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by the assignment of `speci¯c targeting rules' (as proposed in Svensson, 2003) that
each policymaker should follow. These speci¯c targeting rules represent Euler
equations derived from the behavior of optimizing central banks.
Our goal is to design targeting rules that are optimal from the cooperative
perspective. To this end we follow the method proposed by Giannoni and Woodford
(2002). In a linear-quadratic model they show that optimal targeting rules can be
obtained by eliminating the lagrange multipliers from the ¯rst-order conditions
of the optimal policy problem. Targeting rules built on this principle present
some desirable characteristics. First, by ensuring that these targeting rules hold
at all time, a determinate rational expectations equilibrium can be achieved and
this equilibrium coincides with the optimal policy from a timeless perspective.
Second, these targeting rules are optimal regardless the statistical properties of
the exogenous shocks. They depend on the shocks insofar as the targets speci¯ed
in the loss function depend on them.
To derive the desirable targeting rules we use the ¯rst-order conditions (3.16)
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F;t + n°¢qt = 0: (5.28)
We now use the following price relations, the terms of trade identity in ¯rst di®er-
ence
^ Tt = ^ Tt¡1 + ¢St + ¼
¤
F;t ¡ ¼H;t; (5.29)
and the PPP as well in ¯rst di®erence
¼t = n¼H;t + (1 ¡ n)(¢St + ¼
¤
F;t) = ¢St + ¼
¤
t: (5.30)
Using (5.29) and (5.30), we can rewrite (5.27) and (5.28) as17
(·¸
w
¼h + °)¼H;t + ¸
w












t ¡ ~ ¼
¤
t) = 0; (5.32)
where ~ ¼t ´ (1 ¡ n)(~ T ¤
t ¡ ~ T ¤
t¡1) and ~ ¼¤
t ´ ¡n(~ T ¤
t ¡ ~ T ¤
t¡1):
We interpret conditions (5.31) and (5.32) as the targeting rules that the two
central banks have to follow in order to implement the optimal cooperative alloca-
tion from a `timeless perspective'. In particular, (5.31) should be assigned to the
monetary policymaker in country H and (5.32) to the policymaker in country F:
Surprisingly, each of these rules involves only a relation among domestic variables
as the GDP in°ation rate, the growth of domestic output and the CPI in°ation
rate. To support this assignment, each of these targeting rules can be derived as
the result of a Nash game in which each policymaker chooses the sequence of its
GPD in°ation rate as a function of the shocks taking as given the strategy of the
other policymaker and minimizing the common loss function (3.12).
As in the general approach of Giannoni and Woodford (2002), we show in the
appendix that by committing to these rules a determinate rational expectations
equilibrium can be achieved that implements the optimal cooperative solution from
a `timeless perspective'.
The above rules present some other interesting characteristics. For both poli-
cymakers, they involve the same set of target variables {GDP, CPI in°ation and
17We thank Mike Woodford for suggesting this interpretation.
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ever, each of these target variables enters into the targeting rule in deviation to a
`desired' target which is instead country speci¯c. For both countries, the `desired'
target for GDP in°ation is zero, while the `desired' targets for output and CPI
in°ation are in general di®erent from zero and country speci¯c. Most interesting,
the `desired' targets for CPI in°ation rates move in the opposite direction when
comparing the two countries and implicitly de¯ne a desired path for the exchange
rate such that lnSt=¹ S = ~ T ¤
t .
These targeting rules are also °exible, in the words of Svensson, meaning that
each `desired' target for the target variable does not need to be necessarily achieved,
but what matter is only an appropriate linear combination given by the parameters
of the model of target variables with respect to `desired' targets.
Di®erently from the closed-economy counterpart (see Giannoni and Woodford,
2003), our targeting rules should include a distinction between GDP and CPI
in°ation rates. Indeed, in the basic model by Giannoni and Woodford (2003),
with only sticky prices and monopolistic competition, the optimal targeting rule is
expressed as a combination of in°ation rate and output growth with respect to a
desired target. In their framework there is no distinction between GDP and CPI
in°ation rates.
The extent to which the CPI target is relevant depends on the parameters
of the model and not on the kind of disturbance that a®ects the economy. The
dependence on CPI target disappears when steady-state monopolistic distortions
are completely o®set, ¹ ¹ = 1; the two economies are independent, ½µ = 1, and when
in the steady-state government purchase is equal to zero, sc = 1. Interestingly, the
case µ = 1 does not appear as a case that exclude CPI from the target and in
general the conditions that de¯ne the absence of gains from coordination do not
necessarily coincide with the conditions that exclude CPI in°ation from the target.
Figure 3 plots the impulse response function following a home productivity
shock of the target variables that are part of the targeting rules and their `desired'
targets. Consistent with our previous result, all the gaps are quantitatively zero
following a productivity shock. Home CPI in°ation rate and output growth (and
their desired levels) jump on impact and then turn negatively to restore the initial
level of the variables. The opposite occurs in the foreign country. Most interesting,
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Figure 3: Impulse responses of the target variables and `desired' targets in the
targeting rules following a home productivity shock.
Figure 4 shows the impulse response functions following a home mark-up shock.
This ¯gure features the °exibility of adopting such targeting rules. While on im-
pact GDP in°ation overshoots its `desired' value of zero, CPI in°ation and output
growth undershoot their `desired' level. The opposite occurs in the subsequent
periods. While the GDP price level should not move following the shock, the ac-
tual GDP price increases and then converges to the initial steady state. On the
opposite, output and the CPI price level should fall and the converge monotoni-
cally to their initial value. Instead, their actual values fall more and then converge
monotonically to the initial values at a faster speed.
The implementation of these targeting rules can be in principle solved as in
Persson and Tabellini (1995) and Jensen (2000). Central banks are assumed to
be risk neutral and their objective function is designed to be the loss function of
the country plus a penalty determined by a contract which is written in terms of
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Figure 4: Impulse responses of the target variables and `desired' targets in the
targeting rules following a home mark-up shock.
observable variables.18 Given these modi¯ed loss functions, the two central banks,
acting in a non-cooperative equilibrium, implement the cooperative outcome. In
our context, maintaining the assumption that central banks are risk neutral, we
can design contracts of the form ±i
0 ¡ ±i
1(¤i








y ¢yH;t ¡ °(¼t ¡ ~ ¼t). Given these contracts, central banks are forced to
follow the targeting rules. However, the restriction written in the contract is not
stronger than the one implied by adjusting the objective functions of the central
banks using contracts, in the fashion of Persson and Tabellini (1995) and Jensen
(2000). As in these approaches, central banks maintain the °exibility implicit in
18In Persson and Tabellini (1995, 1996), the contract is restricted to be linear in observed
variables but the optimal contract need to have state-contingent parameters. Jensen (2000)
shows that by assigning quadratic contracts in observed variables the contract can be made
non-state contingent.
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meet their objectives. However, both our approach and theirs do not really solve
the delegation problem and shift the cooperation problem at the delegation stage.19
6 Conclusions
We have shown that in a two-country general equilibrium model characterized by
goods and ¯nancial markets integration, the e±cient paths of the exchange rate
and prices depend on the source of the disturbance that hits the economy. The
interaction between the existing distortions and source of disturbance generates
in general gains from cooperation so that policymakers that maximize their own
welfare behave ine±ciently in the non-cooperative allocation. This lack of coor-
dination can be amended by assigning simple targeting rules to each policymaker
so that the optimal cooperative outcome can be achieved. We have shown that
surprisingly these rules depend only on domestic variables despite full goods and
capital market integration.
Further research should investigate the robustness of these ¯ndings for economies
in which asset markets are incomplete and when consumer prices are less respon-
sive to exchange rate changes as in Devereux and Engel (2003) and possibly also
the interdependence between monetary and ¯scal policies that we have neglected
here.
19Indeed, each country has no incentive to assign to its central bank that type of contract even
in the case that the other country is behaving in that way. This is discussed in McCallum (1995)
and extensively in Bilbiie (2002).
One solution would be to follow the folk theorem in delegation games of Fershtman et al.
(1991), as in Persson and Tabellini (1995), and condition the parameters of the contracts, ±i
0
and ±i
1, to the possible outcomes as in \take-it-or-leave-it" o®ers. However, this set of state-
contingent non-linear contracts will be highly unrealistic since part of them is contingent on the
payo®s, which can be di±cult to observe. The other solution, as in Persson and Tabellini (1995),
is to consider a delegation to a common supranational institutions endowed with the cooperative
loss function with the task to design appropriately contracts for the single central banks. Since,
the cooperative solution is a Pareto allocation and creates a surplus over the non-cooperative
allocation, in principle it would be possible to exploit the surplus to design a game in which
each country obtains at least the non-cooperative outcome and participate to the international
agreement; at the same time all the other agents in the economy, the supranational institutions
and the two central bank, have their individual rationality constraint satis¯ed.
ECB • Working Paper No 279 • October 2003 32rules. We have brie°y addressed this issue acknowledging that, as in previous
contributions in the literature, the cooperation problem is simply shift at the del-
egation stage to a supranational authority.
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Technical Appendix
The technical appendix is available under the webpage of the Authors.
Proof of determinacy of the optimal cooperative solution
We show that the ¯rst-order conditions (3.16){(3.20) combined with the con-
straints (3.13){(3.15) and the initial conditions '1;¡1 and '2;¡1 yield to a determi-
nate equilibrium. First we use (3.16){(3.20) and (3.15) to write (3.13) and (3.14)
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¼f, ¸y, ¸q, ~ ¸q are de¯ned in the technical appendix. In particular,
under reasonable parameters' restriction, ¸w
¼h > 0, ¸w
¼f > 0, ¸y > 0, ~ ¸q > 0 which














t ´ ['t 't¡1] and 't ´ ['1;t '2;t]; ²0
t ´ [ut u¤
t], Aj with j = 1;2;3; and B1
















































and B1 is a block-diagonal matrix with elements »·, »·¤. In order to study deter-
minacy, we need to inspect the roots of the characteristic polynomial associated
with the matrix A which is
P(Ã) = Ã
4 ¡ (a11 + a22)Ã
3 + (a11a22 ¡ a21a12 + 2¯
¡1)Ã
2 ¡ (a11 + a22)¯
¡1Ã + ¯
¡2:
First we note that
Ã1Ã2Ã3Ã4 = ¯
¡2; (A.4)
Ã1 + Ã2 + Ã3 + Ã4 = a11 + a22 > 2(1 + ¯
¡1); (A.5)
moreover if P(Ã) = 0 then P(Ã¡1¯¡1) = 0 so that we can further conclude that
Ã1Ã2 = ¯
¡1 Ã3Ã4 = ¯
¡1: (A.6)
Moreover, by Descartes sign rule all the roots are positive. We note that
P(1) = (1 + ¯
¡1)
2 ¡ (1 + ¯








The fact that all the roots are positive and that P(1) > 0,P(0) > 0 imply that
there are either 0 or 2 real or complex roots or 4 complex roots within the unit
circle. Conditions (A.5) and (A.6) exclude the ¯rst and latter possibilities. From
conditions (A.6), we can further conclude that the two roots are within the unit
circle. The unique and stable solution of the system is obtained with the following
ECB • Working Paper No 279 • October 2003 39steps. Let V the two by four matrix of left eigenvectors associated with the unstable
roots. By pre-multiplying the system (A.3) with V we obtain
Etkt+1 = ¤kt + V B²t (A.7)
where ¤ is a two by two diagonal matrix of the unstable eigenvalues on the diagonal
















where V1 and V2 are such that V = [V1 V2]. Equation (A.8) characterizes the
optimal path of the vector 't given initial condition '¡1; the paths for yH, y¤
F, ¼H,
¼¤
F, qt can be derived using the conditions (3.16){(3.20):
Proof of determinacy of the solution implemented by the targeting
rules.
We now show that the targeting rules (5.31) and (5.32), combined with the con-
ditions (5.29) and (5.30) and the constraints (3.13) to (3.15) yield to a determinate
equilibrium that coincides with the optimal cooperative solution. We follow here
an argument similar to Woodford (2003, ch. 6). It is easy to see that (5.31) and
(5.32) combined with the conditions (5.29) and (5.30) imply (5.27) and (5.28). Let
us de¯ne '1;t and '2;t for all t ¸ ¡1 as
'1;t ´ ¸
w





F;t + n°qt; (A.10)
from which it follows that
·¸
w
¼h¼H;t = ¡('1;t ¡ '1;t¡1); (A.11)





F;t = ¡('2;t ¡ '2;t¡1): (A.12)
Using (3.15) and (A.9)-(A.12), we can then retrieve the system of equations (A.1)
and (A.2) which yields to a determinate equilibrium given the initial conditions
'1;¡1 ´ ¸
w






Indeed the lagrangian multiplier '1;¡1 and '2;¡1 measure the commitment to ex-
pectations taken in periods before time 0. The timeless perspective optimal policy
is the one that assigns a particular value to the commitment to expectations prior
to period 0 such that the resulting optimal policy is time invariant.
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